We study the limitations of the 'credit channel' in transmitting monetary policy into real economic outcomes. We focus on one particular failure of the credit channel in which, while the central bank is infusing money into the banking system, liquidity gets stuck in banks' balance sheets. Instead of lending out to firms, banks prefer to hold to the funds. We use the term 'credit traps' to describe situations in which liquidity gets into the banking system but very little lending is taking place as a result. Our analysis offers a characterization of both the problems created by credit traps as well as potential solutions and policy implications.
Introduction
According to the 'credit channel' view of monetary policy transmission, shocks to monetary policy affect the economy through their impact on financial frictions and the availability of credit. This credit view is generally divided into two distinct channels. The first is the 'balance sheet channel' in which monetary shocks affect borrower balance sheets. An easing of monetary policy strengthens firms' balance sheets -e.g. by reducing interest rates and raising collateral values -reducing the cost of external capital which promotes investment and spending. The second channel emphasizes the importance of bank loans to economic activity and is known as the 'bank lending channel'.
According to this view, an expansion of monetary policy shifts the supply of banks loans outwards, and as a result leads to an increase in investment and aggregate demand. While both channels predict that expansionary monetary policy should lead to increased economic activity, there is little theoretical analysis of the limits to the transmission of monetary policy, and particularly one which takes a unified view of the two credit channels of the transmission of monetary policy. 1 In this paper we analyze the limitations of both the 'balance sheet channel' and the 'lending channel' in transmitting monetary policy into real economic outcomes.
Our paper focuses on one particular failure of monetary policy in which, although the central bank is infusing money into the banking system, liquidity gets stuck in banks. Instead of using the increase in reserves stemming from an expansionary monetary policy to provide credit to firms, banks choose to hold on to the additional funds. Our paper thus analyzes situations in which despite the best efforts of the central bank to provide liquidity to the corporate sector, banks will hoard the additional liquidity created instead of using it for financial intermediation. We use the term 'credit traps' to describe this scenario in which liquidity enters the banking system but no or very little lending takes place as a result.
As motivating evidence for credit traps, consider the U.S. financial system during the ongoing financial crisis of 2008-2009. even amongst banks with strong balance sheets. 5 In doing so, it points to the limits of monetary policy when liquidity in the corporate sector is comparatively low.
As a starting point for the model, we assume that firms cannot easily commit to repay their loans because of agency problems and incomplete contracts (see Aghion and Bolton (1992) , Moore, (1994, 1998) ). In such an environment, lending is determined solely by collateral, and debt capacity is fully determined by liquidation values with lower liquidation values associated with lower debt capacity levels.
The mechanism of our model hinges on a feedback loop between collateral values, lending, and liquidity in the corporate sector. According to this, increases in collateral values allow greater lending due to the attendant reductions in financial frictions; Greater lending, in turn, increases liquidity in the corporate sector; Finally, increases in corporate liquidity serve to increase collateral values, as these are determined in part by the ability of industry peers to purchase firm assets (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992) .
6 Our analysis is closely related to Holmström and Tirole (1997) Ivashina and Scharfstein (2008) show that the increase in loans is due to large draw downs from existing credit facilities by low quality firms, and as such, is driven by pre-existing contractual obligations of banks rather than the supply of new loans.
4 This cash hoarding effect remains qualitatively unchanged even when subtracting the Fed's direct provision of liquidity to the corporate sector under programs such as the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF).
5 Clearly, part of the increase in cash holdings is due to capital depletion in banks, such as those holding securitized assets. Diamond and Rajan (2009) , Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2008) and Shleifer and Vishny (2009) provide a theoretical framework for the financial crisis and policy implications based on the role that securitization played in recent years. Bolton and Freixas (2006) analyze the role that the equity-capital base plays in the transmission of monetary policy, and find multiple equilibria.
6 Following the intuition in Shleifer and Vishny (1992) , we use the notions of collateral values and liquidation values interchangeably.
supply and demand have counteracting effects on the equilibrium interest rate, although both serve to increase lending and investment (see Figure 7 ).
The second type of equilibrium in our model is the 'credit trap' equilibrium. In this equilibrium, any easing of monetary policy beyond a certain level is completely ineffective in increasing lending -banks simply hold on to the additional reserves created by the central bank. In the 'credit trap' equilibrium aggregate lending is constrained by low collateral values. To increase collateral values, the central bank would need to induce banks to inject additional liquidity into the corporate sector so as to increase firms' ability to purchase the assets of other industry participants. However, the low value of collateral prevents banks from supplying this needed additional liquidity. Credit will thus remain stuck in banks and collateral values will not increase. We show that if initial collateral values and aggregate corporate liquidity are low, such a credit trap will arise.
Figure 3a depicts a credit trap equilibrium. For any level of reserves R, Curve A depicts the value of collateral assuming that R is lent out by banks. (Curve A increases in R: As the amount of loans rises implied collateral values increase due to the increased liquidity in the corporate sector.) Curve B depicts the minimum level of collateral needed to extract R in loans from banks. (Curve B increases in R since collateral values need to be higher to extract a larger amount of loans.) The maximum loan amount that can then be extracted is R * , where the two curves intersect: for any R > R * , the implied collateral value assuming that R is lent out will be smaller than the minimum collateral value needed to extract R. Banks will therefore lend out R * and hoard any additional reserves provided by the central bank beyond R * .
While monetary policy is ineffective in a credit trap equilibrium, our model shows how fiscal policy can be useful in increasing bank lending. This occurs because expansionary fiscal policy can circumvent financial intermediaries and inject liquidity directly into the corporate sector. The increase in corporate liquidity endogenously increases collateral values which enables some of the credit trapped in banks to be lent out. Further, the model shows how the impact of fiscal policy will be state-contingent and, in particular, depend on the level of liquidity in the corporate sector.
Assessing the magnitude of the fiscal policy multiplier using an unconditional average of historic estimates, as conducted during the debate regarding the fiscal stimulus passed in the first quarter of 2009, may therefore provide a misleading result as to fiscal policy efficacy.
The third equilibrium type in our model is the 'jump start' equilibrium. In this equilibrium monetary policy can be effective, but only when the central bank acts sufficiently forcefully in in-4 jecting reserves to the banking sector. When increasing reserves by only a moderate amount, credit remains trapped in the banking sector as in a credit trap equilibrium. Banks rationally understand that when they can employ only a moderate amount of reserves to lend to firms, the implied collateral values are too small to justify any actual lending. However, when the central bank eases monetary policy sufficiently, a high lending -high collateral value rational expectations equilibrium arises: banks lend, corporate liquidity increases, and hence collateral values are sufficiently high to justify the large amount of lending. Figure 3b depicts a jump start equilibrium -no amount of reserves R strictly between R * 1 and R * 2 can be lent out by banks, as the value of collateral implied by R being lent out is smaller than the minimum value of collateral needed in order to extract R in loans from banks. In contrast, if the central bank acts sufficiently forcefully and injects R * 2 in reserves into the banking system, banks will be able to lend out R * 2 . The 'jump start' equilibrium described in the model sheds light on the necessary conditions for an effective policy of 'quantitative easing' and its underlying mechanism. 9 Such quantitative easing was used by the Bank of Japan from March 2001 to March 2006 as part of its attempt to stimulate the nation's stagnant economy. However, while the Bank of Japan injected large amounts of reserves into the banking system, reducing the overnight call rate effectively to zero, quantitative easing had limited success in spurring bank lending. Consistent with a 'jump start' equilibrium, the limited success of quantitative easing is, in part, attributed to the Bank of Japan's failure to act decisively in injecting liquidity and its decision to withdraw the added liquidity too early. The 'jump start' equilibrium in our model provides theoretical support for a policy of quantitative easing, showing how such easing can be effective in increasing lending, but only under certain circumstances. We argue that the level of liquidity in the corporate sector and its distribution are two key factors in distinguishing between the 'credit trap' equilibrium, in which quantitative easing is ineffective, and the 'jump start' equilibrium, in which quantitative easing can result in renewed lending. Still, since the model predicts that interest rates and lending in the two equilibria will behave similarly so long as the central bank does not actually undertake a policy of quantitative easing, differentiating between the two equilibria will be difficult.
Finally, our paper shows how small drops in productivity can lead to collapses in lending, 9 Quantitative easing is a monetary policy tool in which a central bank focuses on increasing the money supply when standard interest rate targeting is of little use, such as when the funds rate is close to zero. By conducting open-market operations, lending money directly to banks, or purchasing assets from financial institutions, banks are encouraged to lend. 5 aggregate investment, and collateral prices. Again, the intuition is based on the feedback loop between lending, liquidity, and collateral. A small reduction in productivity decreases expected liquidity in the corporate sector, causing a small reduction in collateral values. The reduction in collateral values reduces lending, which reduces corporate liquidity and collateral values still further. Under certain conditions, this process reinforces itself until it reaches a low collateral value and low lending equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 1 explains the setup of the model. Section 2 analyzes the benchmark case in which liquidation values are determined exogenously. In Section 3 we endogenize liquidation values and study their effect on the credit channel of monetary policy. Section 6 summarizes the results of the theoretical model and discusses policy implications. Section 7 concludes.
Model Setup
Consider an economy comprised of a continuous set of firms with measure normalized to unity, a set of commercial banks which can supply capital to firms, and a central bank. The firms in our model are each endowed with an identical opportunity to invest in a project which requires an initial outlay of I at date 0, and returns a cash flow of X 1 in date 1 and X 2 in date 2. As in Hart and Moore (1998) cash flows are assumed to be unverifiable. For simplicity we assume that I < X 1 < X 2 . While by no means necessary, this assumption eases exposition and is consistent with our main interest of tight liquidity in date 1. If undertaken, a project can be liquidated at date 1 for a value denoted by L. The liquidation value of assets will play a key role in the analysis and will be described further below.
Firms differ in their level of internal wealth, A, with A distributed over the support [0, I] . For convenience, firms are parameterized by the level of borrowing that they require in order to invest in the project B = I − A. We assume that B, the initial amount of funding needed by firms to invest in their project, is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function G().
To invest in their project, firms can borrow capital from banks. We assume that firms cannot issue bonds in the capital markets. While this is a strong assumption, adding a bond market does not change our results qualitatively, as long as banks are assumed to have some informational or monitoring advantage in providing capital. 10 10 That intermediated loans are somehow 'special' is a fundamental assumption in the lending channel literature As is common in the literature on the lending channel of monetary policy (see, e.g. Kashyap and Stein (1994) ) we assume, for simplicity, that the supply of loanable funds, R, is directly determined by the central bank through its choice of open market operations. 11 Implicitly, therefore, we are assuming that, as in Myers and Majluf (1984) or Stein (1997) , there are frictions in banks' ability to raise external non-insured finance such as equity. The interest rate on loans, r, is determined in equilibrium so as to equate demand and supply of loanable funds.
Finally, both banks as well as firms can invest in a security yielding a return normalized to zero rather than engaging in lending or borrowing related to a project. One can think of this security as investment in government debt. 12 While most of our predictions stem from a general equilibrium analysis in which we endogenize the liquidation value L of the project, it is useful to begin the analysis with the benchmark case of exogenous liquidation values.
The Benchmark Case: Exogenous Liquidation Values
We begin by assuming that the liquidation value of the project L is exogenously determined. As we show in the next section, we can restrict our attention to cases in which L is smaller than X 1 , since once L is endogenized this inequality holds in equilibrium. Further, we consider the more interesting case where L < I. 13 Consider a firm which needs to borrow an amount B to invest in its project and is faced with an interest rate r. Since cash flow is unverifiable, there is no way to induce the firm to repay at date 2. As is common in the literature in incomplete financial contracts, the only method to induce the firm to repay at date 1 is through the threat of liquidation (e.g., Aghion and Bolton (1992), Hart and Moore (1994) ). Assuming that at date 1 the firm has all the bargaining power in renegotiating its debt obligation with its bank, the firm will never be able to commit to repay more than L at date 1 as it can always bargain down its repayment to the bank's outside option. Thus, the firm (see Bernanke and Blinder, 1988) .
11 The central bank is exogenous to the model -its sole role is in influencing R -so that it is not assigned an objective function.
12 The interest rate provided by government debt could be endogenized and depend on the level of demand for such debt by both the banking and corporate sector. Doing so would not change our main results.
13 When L > I the analysis continues to hold but the financial frictions are negligible since liquidation of the project at the end of the first period would yield enough to fully repay the bank.
will be able to borrow an amount B only when B(1 + r) ≤ L, or equivalently, when
Faced with an interest rate r, a firm will choose to borrow B and invest in its project rather than invest its internal funds A in the zero-interest security when
or equivalently, since B = I − A, when
Inequality (3) represents the participation constraints of firms that is driven by the cash flows generated by the project and their initial financial constraints. Combining (1) and (3) yields that at an interest rate r, all firms with
are both able and willing to borrow funds to invest in their respective projects. Denoting by B * (r) the marginal firm which borrows and invests in the project as a function of the interest rate r, we
At any interest rate r, the demand for capital generated by firms is therefore given by:
Because of the financial frictions -as operationalized through the assumption that cash flow is nonverifiable -the demand for loanable funds is determined in part by the ability of firms to borrow and not just by their desire to do so. Figure 3 provides a graphic illustration of this situation. We plot the amount of funds that the firm needs, B, on the horizontal axis as a function of the prevailing interest rate r which is on the vertical axis. When L ≥ X 1 +X 2 −I, for low enough r inequality (1) binds while inequality (3) does not, and demand for loanable funds is determined by firms' ability to borrow (as constrained by liquidation values) rather their desire to borrow (as determined by the participation constraint). In this case, the marginal firm that borrows is therefore given by B = L/(1 + r). 14 14 When L < X1 +X2 −I, inequality 3 never binds, and demand for loanable funds is determined solely by inequality 1 -i.e. firms' ability to borrow as constrained by asset liquidation values. The marginal firm that borrows is therefore B = L/(1 + r), for any r.
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The liquidation value of assets, L, thus plays an important role in determining demand for loanable funds through its impact on financial constraints. To emphasize this, we refer to the demand function in (5) as 'effective demand', thereby differentiating it from the demand that would have been obtained under no financial frictions.
15
Equilibrium in the model is determined by equating effective demand for loanable funds to the supply of loanable funds:
As the central bank increases the supply of funds, the interest rate decreases and the aggregate amount of loans increases. When the binding constraint on firm borrowing is determined by financial constraints (i.e. the marginal firm borrowing has a borrowing requirement of B * = L/(1 + r)), the decrease in interest rates relaxes the borrowing constraint and enables effective demand to increase.
However, as can be seen from (5) Endogenizing the value of collateral is therefore crucial to understanding the limits of monetary policy. We turn to this in the next section.
15 The latter is determined solely by inequality (3). 
The Credit Channel with Endogenous Liquidation Values
To endogenize liquidation values, we assume that when a bank repossess the assets of a firm which has defaulted it must sell these assets in a market instead of operating the asset itself. The value obtained in this sale is the liquidation value of assets. Following Shleifer and Vishny (1992) , we assume that the best users of a defaulted firm's assets are other firms within the same industry. 16 Industry participants bid for the defaulted firm's assets, so that demand will be determined both by the potential value of the assets as well as, importantly, the liquidity constraints of the bidders.
As in Shleifer and Vishny (1992) , if the liquidity available to the bidders is sufficiently low, the value obtained for the asset will be lower than its first-best value. 17
Before continuing, it is useful to provide a general description of the model's main effects.
The model combines the 'balance-sheet channel' and the 'lending channel' in a general equilibrium rational expectation framework. This can be described with the following series of interlocking forces. When the central bank eases monetary policy, the supply of loanable funds increases.
Similar to a standard lending channel effect (see e.g. Stein (1998) ), banks will tend to lend out more funds, all else equal, which will increase liquidity in the corporate sector. As liquidity in the corporate sector increases, liquidation value of assets will increase due to a Shleifer-Vishny effectfirms become less liquidity constrained, and can hence bid more aggressively when acquiring assets of liquidated firms. As in a standard 'balance sheet channel' effect (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (1989 , 1990 , 1995 ) Lamont (1995 ), the endogenous increase in liquidation values improves firms' collateral positions, which enables them to borrow that additional liquidity which was injected to the commercial banks by the central bank. In equilibrium, the lending and balance sheet channels of monetary policy are therefore linked through endogenous liquidation values: increased bank lending leads to greater liquidity in the corporate sector and thus higher collateral prices, while higher collateral prices reduces financial frictions and enables banks to increase lending to firms. 18
Rather than imposing a particular structure on the market for repossessed assets, we analyze the results using a general reduced-form specification. Specifically, the price of a firm's liquidated assets will depend in a general manner on the level of liquidity in the corporate sector and its distribution. Accordingly, we define a pricing function, P , for the liquidation value of assets which takes as inputs two variables which jointly span the level and distribution of liquidity at date 1 within the corporate sector. The first variable is the marginal firm that successfully obtained funding at date 0, B * . The second variable in P is the equilibrium interest rate r * paid by firms borrowing at date 0. 19 Thus, if a firm defaults and its assets are repossessed by its bank and sold on the market, the price of these assets will be P = P (B * , r * ). For simplicity, we assume that all assets of a firm are essential in generating cash flow, which implies that partial liquidation of assets is useless. This implies that if a firm defaults and its assets are repossessed by its bank and sold on the market, the maximal price of these assets will be X 1 -the maximal amount of cash holdings of any potential buying firm.
Since the price of liquidated assets will be nondecreasing in date 1 corporate liquidity, we make the following assumptions:
These assumptions are straightforward. First, as the proportion of firms obtaining funding at date 0 increases, date 1 liquidity will increase so that the price of liquidated assets will be non increasing in B * . Similarly, as the interest rate at which firms borrow increases, date 1 liquidity decreases, so that P will be non-increasing in r * .
Given a pricing function P , an equilibrium in the lending market is characterized as follows: 19 Other exogenous determinants of the date 1 distribution of liquidity is the date 0 distribution of internal funds, G, and the level of date 1 cash flows X1. In this section, we suppress in our notation of the pricing function its dependency on G and X1. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we consider how the pricing function varies with these exogenous variables. For simplicity, we assume that P is differentiable in B * , r * , and X1, and is continuous in G under the uniform metric.
the market clearing condition is
with strict inequality only when r = 0.
The equilibrium requirements are quite intuitive. First, in equilibrium firms will optimize their borrowing choices. Since each individual firm takes the liquidation value L * as exogenous, this requirement translates into the optimality conditions developed in the previous section in inequalities (1) and (3) -i.e. that a firm with borrowing requirement B borrows if and only if
In optimizing lending decisions, banks will lend at the equilibrium interest rate r * while understanding that firms cannot commit to repay more than L * . In equilibrium for any rate r * > 0 realized demand for loanable funds will equal supply, while, in contrast, when r * = 0 the supply of loanable funds can be greater than the demand -any excess supply will simply be invested by the banks in the zero-interest security. 20
Finally, equilibrium requirement (iv) is a rational expectations condition, stating that the liquidation value of assets taken as given by individual banks and firms when making their date 0 decisions is indeed the date 1 price of liquidated assets. As described above, this price is determined through a Shleifer-Vishny (1992) equilibrium by the liquidity in the corporate sector and is governed by the pricing function P . It should be noted that since there is no uncertainty about project outcomes there will be no liquidation on the equilibrium path.
We solve for the equilibrium in the following manner. First, from our analysis in the case of exogenous liquidation values in Section 2, we know that for every potential liquidation value L and loan supply R, there exists an equilibrium interest rate r * which clears the market for loanable funds, i.e. satisfies Inequality (7). We denote this market clearing equilibrium rate as r * (L; R).
Furthermore, by condition (4) above, for any interest rate r, banks will agree to lend to any firm 20 Note that the assumption that banks cannot raise external finance implies that no bank will be able to reduce the interest rate it offers to increase loan capacity and profits. Essentially, banks' marginal cost of raising funds beyond the reserves they have is assumed to be infinite. More generally, as in a standard lending channel, all that is required is non-zero marginal costs in raising non-reservable forms of liabilities.
with required borrowing B smaller than L/(1 + r). Finally, for any interest rate r, all firms with borrowing requirements B ≤ (X 1 + X 2 − I)/r will optimally choose to borrow and invest in their projects. Thus, for every potential liquidation value L and loan supply R, the marginal firm
We can therefore define an indirect pricing function p(L; R) ≡ P (B * (L; R), r * (L; R)) as a function of the liquidation value L and the exogenously given loan supply R. For equilibrium condition (iv) to be satisfied, the equilibrium liquidation value L * must then satisfy p(L * ; R) = L * . That is, the price of liquidated assets should satisfy rational expectations in equilibrium: if banks at date 0 lend capital under the assumption that the date 1 liquidation value of assets will be L * , then at date 1, the price of liquidated assets should indeed be L * . Rational expectations are required since this date 1 price of liquidated assets is determined through a Shleifer Vishny (1992) equilibrium by the amount of liquidity in the corporate sector in date 1, which, in turn, is determined in part by the amount of loans provided by the banks in date 0. Formally, we thus have the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Given an exogenous supply of loans R, all equilibrium liquidation values
The equilibrium interest rate is then given by r * (L * ; R), while the marginal firm that borrows in this equilibrium is given by B * (L * ; R).
Proof. See Appendix.
To characterize the pricing function p(L; R), it is useful to define for every amount of loanable funds, R, the valueB(R) which represents the marginal firm that obtains financing assuming that the full amount R is lent out by banks. It is easy to see thatB(R) is given implicitly by the equation:
Having definedB(R), the indirect pricing function p(L; R) is characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Fix an exogenous loan supply R ≤ I 0 BdG(B) and liquidation value of assets L. (1) For any L ≤B(R):
(i) The equilibrium interest rate associated with L will be r * = 0, and the marginal firm able to borrow will have a borrowing requirement of L.
(ii) The pricing function satisfies p(L; R) = P (L, 0).
will be smaller than the supply R, implying that not all of the supply will be lent out.
(2) For any L >B(R):
(i) The marginal firm able to borrow will have a borrowing requirement ofB(R) and the equilibrium interest rate associated with L will be that r * solvingB(R) = B * (r).
(ii) The pricing function satisfies p(L; R) = P (B(R), r * ).
(iii) The market for loanable funds clears: demand for loans,
BdG(B), equals loan supply

R.
To understand Proposition 2 consider first a potential equilibrium liquidation value L satisfying L ≤B(R). To see why the equilibrium interest associated with L will be zero, note that the marginal firm successfully able to borrow will have a borrowing requirement of B = L, implying a realized demand of L 0 BdG(B). Since, by assumption, L is smaller thanB(R), realized demand at a zero interest rate will be smaller than
BdG(B) = R, the supply of loanable funds. Since equilibrium interest rates cannot fall below zero, the equilibrium interest rate associated with any L smaller thanB(R) will indeed be zero and the associated marginal borrowing firm will have B = L.
Thus, the pricing function will satisfy p(L; R) = P (L, 0) on the region L ≤B(R) (recall that P is the direct pricing function). Further, in equilibrium in this region not all of the loan supply will be lent out: realized aggregate lending ( L 0 BdG(B)) will be smaller than loan supply (R). Consider now a potential equilibrium liquidation value L that satisfies L ≥B(R). Since by the definition ofB(R), realized demand at a zero interest rate will be greater than the supply of loanable funds, R, in equilibrium the interest rate will be greater than zero, and supply and demand for loanable funds will equate. Thus, the marginal firm borrowing will have a borrowing requirement of B =B(R). The interest rate associated with L will then simply be that r solvinḡ
A direct consequence of Proposition 2 which we will use in the next section is:
Corollary 1. Fix an exogenous loan supply R ≤ I 0 BdG(B). The pricing function p(L; R) is increasing in L over the region L <B(R) and decreasing in L over the region L >B(R).
Holding R constant, increasing L has two opposing effects on the price of collateral in period 1, p(L; R). The first effect is that as L increases, more firms are able to raise external finance which increases liquidity in the corporate sector and therefore raises the market price of collateral in period 1. The second effect is that as L increases, more firms are able to borrow. Effective demand for intermediated loans increases, which implies that the equilibrium interest rate of loans rises. An increase in the interest rate reduces liquidity in the corporate sector in period 1, which tends to push down the period-1 price of collateral.
21 When L is low the first effect dominates, while when it is high the second dominates. p(L; R) is therefore non-monotonic in L.
Figure 5 provides an example of the pricing function p for a given level of loanable funds R.
As described in Proposition 2, p is increasing up toB(R) and decreasing following that. 
Monetary Policy, Liquidation Values, and Lending
We now turn to the main point of our paper which is to understand the effect of monetary policy on bank lending behavior. We analyze the effect of changes in R, the supply of loanable funds, on liquidation values, interest rates, and lending when liquidation values are determined endogenously. This is done by considering the effect of changes in R on the pricing function p(L; R). We say that monetary policy is 'ineffective at R' if a marginal increase in the supply of funds by the central bank above R does not change the equilibrium amount of lending by banks to firms. Similarly, we say that monetary policy is fully effective if there exists a value of loan supply, R, such that in the associated equilibrium aggregate lending from banks to firms achieves its maximal possible value -
. As a first step in analyzing the impact of changes in R, it is easy to see from Proposition 2 that p(L; R) is non-decreasing in the loan supply R: i.e., adding liquidity to the economy does not decrease the date 1 price of liquidated assets. Figure 6 illustrates this by presenting the impact of an increase in the supply of funds from R 1 to R 2 . By Proposition 2, the pricing function
andB(R 2 ), by Proposition 2 again, the pricing function p(L; R 2 ) is also equal to P (L, 0). Finally, for L >B(R 2 ), the new pricing function is decreasing in L and equal to P (B(R 2 ), (B * ) −1 (B(R 2 ))).
As can be seen in the figure, P (L, 0) therefore serves as an envelope of p(L; R): the two functions are equal up to the pointB(R), while P (L, 0) is greater than p(L; R) for L greater thanB(R).
The behavior of P (L, 0) turns out to be crucial in understanding the effect of changes in the loan supply on lending, liquidation values and interest rates. Indeed, we have that:
Corollary 2. Consider a loan supply R. Banks will lend out R in loans if and only if P (B(R), 0) ≥
B(R).
Corollary 2 is a direct result of Proposition 2 and is quite intuitive. First, in order to extract R in loans from the banking sector, the value of collateral must be at leastB(R). Otherwise, if the value of collateral, L, is less thanB(R), no firm will be able to borrow more than L, so that the maximal effective demand will be L 0 BdG(B) which is less than the loan supply R (= B (R) 0
BdG(B)).
On the other hand, if R is indeed lent out, the marginal firm obtaining financing will have a borrowing requirement ofB(R) (by definition ofB(R)). Thus, the maximal value of collateral when R is lent out is P (B(R), 0), i.e. when R is lent out at an equilibrium interest rate is zero. Corollary 2 states that if the maximal value of collateral conditional on R being lent out (P (B(R), 0)) is smaller than the minimal amount of collateral required to extract R (B(R)), then R will not be lent out. In contrast, R will be lent out if the maximal collateral value implied by a liquidity injection of R is greater than the minimal value of collateral required to extract R: the equilibrium interest rate and liquidation value will adjust to equate effective loan demand to loan supply, R. 
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(ii) The credit trap equilibrium: (iii) The jump-start equilibrium:
for L=0 and L = L * . Then, monetary policy is not effective up to the loan supply R * satisfyinḡ B(R * ) = L * and is effective at the loan supply R * .
Proof. In the Appendix.
To understand Proposition 3 we consider each of the three equilibrium types in turn.
First, consider the conventional equilibrium in case
(as will be discussed in section 3.3, this is the case of relatively high liquidity in the corporate sector). Since for any R, we have that P (B(R), 0) ≥B(R), by Corollary 2 R is lent out. Monetary policy, in this equilibrium, is therefore fully effective: increases in R are matched one to one with increases in aggregate lending. figure) . The overall chain of events of an increase in loan supply can be summarized as follows: The increased loan supply is lent out to the corporate sector; the increased liquidity in the corporate sector increases collateral values; and finally, the increase in collateral values increases firm debt capacity and enables the increase in loan supply.
Interestingly, the effect on equilibrium interest rates of a shift in loan supply is less clear cut. This is best demonstrated in Figure 7 which graphs loan supply and demand as a function of interest rates, r. The main point is that effective demand for loans is not just a function of the loan interest rate, but is also influenced by collateral values; Firm borrowing in the model is determined both by their desire to borrow as well as their ability to do so. Loan demand can thus be represented by the function D(r; L * ), where L * is the equilibrium collateral price. As can be seen in the figure, an increase in R has two effects. First, loan supply shifts out. Second, effective loan demand shifts out as well -as discussed above, equilibrium liquidation values increase, thereby increasing firm borrowing capacity. The outward shifts in both loan supply and loan demand cause aggregate lending to unambiguously increase, but the net effect on the interest rate is ambiguous. If loan demand shifts out sufficiently -due to a large increase in collateral prices -there can be situations in which the interest rate remains constant or even rises as loan supply R increases. Put differently, in a conventional equilibrium large changes in aggregate lending and investment can be associated with small changes in interest rates. This is consistent with evidence that monetary shocks have large real effects, even though empirical studies show that components of aggregate spending are not very sensitive to cost-of-capital variables (see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler 1995) .
Consider now the credit trap equilibrium represented in case (ii) of Proposition 3. In this equilibrium, monetary policy is ineffective at any point after R * . To see this formally note that for any R < R * ,B(R) <B(R * ) = L * . Thus, the condition stated in case (ii), P (B(R), 0) ≥B(R) in the region R < R * : i.e. in this region, the implied value of collateral conditional on R being lent out is larger than the minimum required collateral value to actually extract R. By Corollary 2 this implies that banks will successfully lend R out. In contrast, for any R > R * , P (B(R), 0) <B(R), which means that in this region, the implied value of collateral conditional on R being lent out is smaller than the minimum required collateral value to actually extract R. By the same corollary, any R > R * will therefore not be lent out.
The equilibrium is depicted in Figure 8a . If the central bank sets reserve level at R < R * , there is a positive equilibrium liquidation value in which aggregate lending is R (L 1 in the figure).
However, monetary policy is completely ineffective at any point beyond R * . As can be seen in the figure, as R increases beyond this point, the sole positive equilibrium liquidation value where p intersects the 45 degree line remains L * . Realized demand thus does not change as R increases above R * . The equilibrium collateral value remains at L * , realized lending remains at R * (with the difference R − R * invested by banks), and, based on Theorem 2(i), the equilibrium interest rate is constant at zero.
The intuition of this credit trap equilibrium is that for any additional loan supply above R * to actually be lent out by banks, liquidation values need to be sufficiently high. However, when the implied pricing function p is comparatively low (as depicted in Figure 8a ), the increase in date-1 liquidation values associated with a marginal increase in the amount of aggregate lending beyond R * is not sufficient to induce banks to actually lend the additional funds at date 0. Monetary policy thus becomes ineffective above the loan supply R * : the only equilibrium has liquidation values equal to L * and aggregate lending fixed at R * .
As an extreme case of a credit trap, when P (L, 0) < L for all L > 0 monetary policy is completely ineffective: no matter the level of loan supply held by banks, the only equilibrium is one in which liquidation values are zero, and hence aggregate lending is zero as well. This can be seen in Figure 8b , where regardless of the level of R, the only point where P intersects the 45 degree line is at zero. Again, the intuition is that for any level of loan supply R, the price of liquidated assets which results when R is lent out by banks is smaller than the minimum liquidated value required to actually extract R in loans from banks.
Consider now the jump-start equilibrium depicted in case (iii) of Proposition 3. By Corollary 2, banks will not lend out any amount of loan supply 0 < R < R * , since for any such R, P (B(R), 0) < B(R) -the value of collateral assuming that R is lent out is smaller than the minimum value needed to extract R. In contrast, if the level of loan supply is R * then P (B(R * ), 0) =B(R * ). This implies that the collateral value L * =B(R * ) satisfies the rational expectations equilibrium requirement and that the entire loan supply R * will be lent out. Thus, only if the central bank raises the loan supply to R * will banks lend out funds. The jump-start equilibrium therfore demonstrates how a policy of 'quantitative easing' may successfully reignite bank lending. As exhibited in Figure 9 , for any loan supply R 1 < R * , the only equilibrium has a liquidation value of L = 0 and no lendingbanks hoard all reserves. rather than those in 3(iii)) will be fruitless.
22 To see this note that for any R < R * , the only value where P (L; R) equals L is L = 0
Exogenous Changes in Corporate Liquidity: Fiscal Policy and Productivity Shocks
In this subsection we examine the effects of an exogenous change in corporate liquidity by analyzing shocks to date 1 cash flow X 1 . Changes in X 1 can be viewed in two ways. The first is simply as representing a productivity shock -which, since there is no asymmetric information in the model -both firms and banks observe. Consider the conventional equilibrium case described in Case (i) of Proposition 3. We have:
Proposition 4(i). Assume that the conditions in Proposition 3(i) hold. For any level of loan supply R, an increase in X 1 increases the equilibrium liquidation value L, increases the equilibrium interest rate r, but does not affect the equilibrium amount of loans provided by the banking sector.
The intuition of Proposition 4(i) is quite simple: In the conventional equilibrium of Proposition 3(i), any loan supply is lent out in full. The main effect of an increase in X 1 is to increase date-1 corporate liquidity and hence to raise the equilibrium collateral value of assets. (This is exhibited in Figure 10 where as a result of the increase in X 1 , p(L; R, X 1 ) rises, implying a higher liquidation value.) As the equilibrium liquidation value of assets rise, effective demand for loans increases which, in turn, increases the equilibrium interest rate. Thus, in a conventional equilibrium, an increase in X 1 caused, say, by expansionary fiscal policy, does not increase aggregate lending.
However, to the extent that collateral values are determined by liquidity in the corporate sector, such expansionary fiscal policy will increase liquidation values and interest rates.
Consider now the effect of an increase in date-1 cash flow, X 1 , in the case of a credit trap equilibrium as described in Proposition 3(ii). We have the following proposition: This process is demonstrated in Figure 11 . First note that in a credit trap equilibrium the maximal liquidation value of assets is the L * satisfying P (L, 0; X 1 ) = L. The corresponding maximal aggregate amount of loans that banks will be willing to provide to firms is thenB −1 (L * ).
Proposition 4(ii). Assume that the conditions in Proposition
Consider now a shift from X increases the maximal borrowing capacity of firms -as exhibited in the increased maximal liquidation value from L * 1 to L * 2 -and enables liquidity to be pulled out of banks. With fiscal policy in place, monetary policy serves to push out liquidity from the banking sector to the corporate sector (in the example, by increasing loan supply fromB −1 (L * 1 ) toB −1 (L * 2 )) employing in the process the positive feedback loop between lending, liquidity and increased collateral values. Lending is therefore jump-started through a push/pull mechanism, where monetary policy serves to push and fiscal policy serves to pull out liquidity from financial intermediaries into firms.
As a final point, interpreting changes in X 1 as productivity shocks leads to a 'sudden stop' effect: small changes in productivity can cause a large reduction in both collateral prices and aggregate lending. Indeed, reducing date 1 cash flow Figure 12 ). The intuition is that a small reduction in date-1 liquidity (X 1 decreasing) reduces collateral values, which reduces lending, which further reduces collateral values. This process reinforces itself until it reaches a low collateral value and low lending equilibrium.
The Effects of Initial Liquidity
In this subsection we analyze how the initial level of liquidity in the corporate sector affects successful monetary policy interventions. We show that if date-0 corporate liquidity is sufficiently low when the central bank decides to intervene, such interventions will not be successful in that banks will not increase lending -put differently, credit traps are likely to arise when initial corporate liquidity is low.
Formally, we analyze the model's comparative statics with respect to the distribution of borrowing requirements, G. Since each firm's borrowing requirement B is equal to I − A, the difference between its internal wealth and the required investment outlay, increases in firm borrowing requirements are associated with decreases in initial corporate liquidity, all else equal. Thus, if G and G are two distributions of firm borrowing requirements with G first order stochastically dominating G, liquidity in the corporate sector is higher under the distribution G as compared to the distribution G . Further, we denote for every distribution G, the aggregate date-0 liquidity in the corporate sector as W (G) :
dG(B).
Clearly, the smallest level of aggregate corporate liquidity in date 0 is zero -this is the situation in which all firms have zero internal wealth, and thus all firms have a borrowing requirement of I.
For what follows, it turns out useful to define P 0 to be the date-1 price of collateral assuming that (1) Aggregate liquidity was zero at date 0 and (2) In date 0 all firms were provided financing at a zero interest rate, so that in date 1 all firms have liquidity X 1 − I.
The next proposition shows that if X 1 is sufficiently small, low levels of date-0 aggregate corporate liquidity necessarily involve credit traps:
Proposition 5. Assume that X 1 is sufficiently small so that P 0 < I. Then there exists a threshold level of aggregate liquidityW such that for all aggregate liquidity levels W <W , the economy is in a credit trap equilibrium.
The intuition of Proposition 5 is as follows. In providing liquidity to the corporate sector, banks need to rely on the aggregate liquidity in the corporate sector, as this determines, in part, the value of collateral and hence the strength of firms' balance sheets. Therefore, when injecting liquidity into the banking sector in the hope of increasing bank lending and jump starting the feedback loop between lending and collateral, the central bank must rely on the initial level of liquidity in the corporate sector. Essentially, the central bank is leveraging the initial level of aggregate liquidity to inject additional liquidity into the corporate sector. Proposition 5 then states that if this initial level of aggregate liquidity is sufficiently low, the central bank's ability to leverage existing liquidity to increase lending will be limited -i.e. the economy will be in a credit trap equilibrium where banks will not increase lending beyond a certain point, regardless of shifts in the loan supply.
The next proposition states that if an economy is in a credit trap, decreases in date-0 corporate liquidity intensify the severity of the credit trap: The maximal level of lending and the maximal value of collateral both decrease. (i) The economy will be in a credit trap equilibrium.
Proposition 6. Consider an economy with a date-0 distribution of borrowing needs
(ii) The maximal aggregate level of loans provided by banks, R * 2 , will be smaller than R * 1 . (iii) The maximal value of collateral, L Proposition 5 and 6 make clear the importance of initial aggregate liquidity when the central bank tries to intervene and inject liquidity into the banking sector. Proposition 5 states that if aggregate liquidity is too low at the point of intervention, the economy will be stuck in a credit trap, while Proposition 6 states that as aggregate liquidity decreases, this credit trap becomes more severe.
Summary and Policy Implications
This section summarizes the main results of our model and discusses some of the attendant policy implications. Our model generates three types of equilibria, each with its own implications. The underlying theme in all three equilibria is a feedback loop between increased loan provision by banks and increased liquidation values of assets.
The Conventional Equilibrium
In the first, conventional equilibrium, monetary policy can successfully influence aggregate lending activity. The chain of linked events, which combines the lending and balance sheet channels of monetary policy, unfolds as follows: When the Fed eases monetary policy, bank reserves rise. The increased liquidity in the banking sector enables banks to increase lending, and hence serves to increase liquidity in the corporate sector. This, in turn, improves collateral values of real assets and therefore strengthens firms' balance sheets. The expected improvement in firms' balance sheets reduces financial frictions and justifies the banks' initial decision to convert the (Fed induced) increase in reserves into additional corporate lending. The rational expectations equilibrium thus makes a full circle: (1) increased liquidity in the banking sector leads to (2) increased lending to the corporate sector, which causes (3) improved firm balance sheets, which justifies (4) the increased bank lending. In this conventional equilibrium, an easing of monetary policy is therefore translated into three effects: an increase in lending, an increase in collateral values, and a change in the interest rate associated with bank lending.
The effect of monetary policy in a conventional equilibrium is nicely demonstrated by considering the market for loanable funds (see Figure 7) where an expansion in monetary policy has two effects. The first is an outward shift in the supply of intermediated loans. The second is an outward shift in loan demand -as described above, collateral values rise, which increases firm borrowing capacity, thereby raising the effective demand for loans. The outward shift in supply and demand for loans associated with a monetary expansion increases aggregate lending unambiguously.
However, the effect on the interest rate of loans is ambiguous. This is because the increase in collateral values and the associated outward shift in the effective demand schedule for loanable funds places upward pressure on the equilibrium interest rate. Indeed, if loan demand shifts out significantly, interest rates may remain constant (or even rise) as loan supply increases. Thus, in a conventional equilibrium large changes in aggregate lending and investment can be associated with small monetary policy induced changes in interest rates. This is consistent with empirical evidence showing that monetary shocks have large real effects, even though components of aggregate spending are not very sensitive to cost-of-capital variables (see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler 1995) . 
The Credit Trap Equilibrium
The second type of equilibrium is characterized by credit traps -beyond a certain level, any easing of monetary policy is completely ineffective in increasing lending -banks simply hold on to the additional reserves created by the Fed. In this equilibrium lending is constrained by low collateral values. To increase collateral values, the Fed would need to induce banks to inject liquidity into the corporate sector so as to increase firms' ability to purchase the assets of other industry participants.
A credit trap arises when for any given level of loan supply (above a certain threshold), the collateral value implied by that loan supply being lent out is less than the minimum collateral value required to actually extract the loan supply in the first place.
As an example, consider the case where a central bank is trying to inject liquidity (through the banking system) into the corporate sector. Without any additional loans, aggregate liquidity in the corporate sector is $1,500B. Assuming that the aggregate value of collateral is worth one tenth of aggregate liquidity, this implies an aggregate collateral value of $150B. By the same assumption, any incremental dollar of loans to the corporate sector will increase aggregate collateral by $0.1.
Finally, assume that to inject $x in loans, aggregate collateral values need to be equal $0.3x. In this example it is easy to see that the maximum amount of lending that can be injected into the economy is that amount R which equates the level of collateral implied by R being lent out with the level of collateral required to extract R. Put differently, it solves the equation 150 + R/10 = 0.3L, implying a maximal level of lending of $750B. At this level, the implied collateral value is $225B which exactly equals the amount required to extract $750B in loans from the banking sector. Any additional amount of reserves above and beyond this amount will simply be held by the banks.
Thus, for example, $800B will not be lent out: the required collateral value to extract $800B is 0.3 * 800 = $240B while the implied level of collateral assuming that $800B is actually lent out is only 150 + 0.1 * 800 = $230B.
More generally, when providing liquidity to the corporate sector banks need to rely on the aggregate liquidity already present in the corporate sector. This is because liquidity in the corporate sector determines, in part, the value of collateral and hence the strength of firms' balance sheets.
Thus, when the central bank injects liquidity into the banking sector in the hope of increasing bank lending, it too must rely on the initial level of liquidity in the corporate sector. Essentially, the central bank is leveraging the initial level of aggregate liquidity to inject additional liquidity into the corporate sector. Proposition 5 in the previous section states that if this initial level of aggregate liquidity is sufficiently low, the central bank's ability to leverage existing liquidity to increase lending will be limited -i.e. the economy will be in a credit trap equilibrium where banks will not increase lending beyond a certain point, regardless of shifts in the loan supply. Further, Proposition 6 shows that reductions in initial aggregate liquidity will make this credit trap more severe. This result underscores the danger of a central bank beginning to ease monetary policy when existing liquidity in the corporate sector is too low. Since the central bank is leveraging preexisting liquidity to support additional lending, if preexisting corporate liquidity is too low, the maximal amount of lending which banks can be induced to lend will be low as well. Khwaja, Mian, and Zia (2007) provide evidence from Pakistan that is consistent with a credit trap equilibrium. One of the consequences of the 9/11 events and Pakistan's ensuing corporation with the U.S. was a large inflow of capital into Pakistan, accompanied by a positive aggregate demand shock. However, despite the availability of abundant credit and investment needs, banks were reluctant to lend. Khwaja, Mian, and Zia (2007) argue that the reason for the lack of lending by banks is driven by the fact that Pakistanian banks relied heavily on pledgeable assets and historical cash flow rather than expected future cash flows. This explanation is consistent with our model in which the extent of lending volume is driven by collateral values and available liquidity in the corporate sector rather than expected cash flows. By directly increasing corporate liquidity, changes in fiscal policy can therefore jump start lending to the corporate sector.
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In sum, in a credit trap equilibrium there is a benefit to monetary and fiscal policy acting in concert; Monetary policy serves to push liquidity out from the banking sector to the corporate sector, while fiscal policy, by directly increasing corporate liquidity and collateral values, serves to pull out liquidity from the banking sector to the corporate sector. Importantly, when used on its own, monetary policy is powerless in disgorging liquidity from intermediaries since firm borrowing capacity (as implied by collateral values) are too low. This result show that the impact of fiscal policy will be state-contingent and will depend crucially on the level of liquidity in the corporate sector. In the context of our model, the benefit of fiscal policy lies in its ability to directly inject liquidity into the corporate sector. Banks (including the central bank) can then leverage this liquidity into additional lending. However, in the con-26 While the underlying foundation is altogether different, this equation is similar to that behind the 'Keynesian Cross' in the standard IS-LM model which gives rise to the fiscal policy multiplier.
27 Indeed, as discussed in section 3.1 in an extreme case, fiscal policy can give rise to a large, discrete jump in lending due to the addition of a second high collateral value equilibrium.
ventional equilibrium, there is no lack of liquidity in the corporate sector. As we show in section 3.2, expansionary fiscal policy does not increase lending, holding constant loan supply. Rather, its sole effect is to increase the interest rate on borrowed loans (which is caused by the outward shift in effective demand.) In contrast, in a credit trap equilibrium, corporate liquidity is lacking and thus fiscal policy can increase lending, as described above. Our model thus predicts a liquiditycontingent multiplier effect of fiscal policy. Assessing the magnitude of the fiscal policy multiplier using an unconditional average of historic estimates may therefore provide a misleading result as to fiscal policy efficacy.
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A natural question to ask is which type of fiscal policy is most effective in increasing private sector lending to firms in a credit trap equilibrium: corporate tax reductions, direct transfer to consumers, or government expenditures. A formal answer is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in the context of the model provided, since the beneficial effect of fiscal policy on lending stems from its impact on collateral values, the comparison between these three methods ultimately rests on their relative effectiveness in directly injecting liquidity into the corporate sector. Here, it seems that reductions in corporate tax payments -be it through tax rebates, corporate tax investments or reduction in tax rates -are most efficient in increasing corporate liquidity, to the extent that firms continue to pay corporate taxes during a downturn associated with a credit trap. In contrast, similar to the standard IS-LM framework, a fraction of any transfer to consumers will be saved, and thus not end up in the corporate sector. While these savings may end up bolstering balance sheets of financial institutions, say in the form of additional deposits in banks, this will have no effect on lending in a credit trap.Indeed, the main problem in a credit trap equilibrium is not the lack of liquidity in the banking sector, but rather insufficient liquidity and low collateral values in the corporate sector. Similarly to direct transfers to consumers, a large fraction of any amount of government spending will take the form of payments to labor, and thus dollar for dollar, this method will also be less effective in increasing liquidity in the corporate sector as compared to direct transfers to firms.
The Jump-Start Equilibrium
In the third equilibrium, which we name the 'jump start' equilibrium, monetary policy becomes effective only when the Fed acts sufficiently forcefully in injecting reserves to the banking sector.
If the Fed increases reserves by only a moderate amount, credit remains trapped in the banking sector and interest rates are stuck at zero. Similar to the credit trap equilibrium, banks rationally understand that when they can employ only a moderate amount of reserves to lend to firms, the implied collateral values are too small to justify any actual lending. In contrast, when the Fed eases monetary policy sufficiently, a high lending and high collateral values equilibrium arises: banks lend out their large amount of loan supply, corporate liquidity increases, and hence collateral values are sufficiently high to justify the large amount of lending.
While this third type of equilibrium is similar to a credit trap equilibrium -over a certain range of loan supply, monetary policy is ineffective in spurring additional lending -the policy implications are quite different. In a credit trap equilibrium monetary policy cannot jump-start lending on its own and thus needs to rely on other actions such as expansive fiscal policy. In a 'jump-start' equilibrium the Fed can escape the credit trap and render monetary policy effective, but only if it acts forcefully enough. The 'jump-start' equilibrium provides, therfore, a justification for a quantitative easing strategy of monetary policy: The Fed increases the amount of reserves in the system while interest rates remain constant at zero, so that finally, when a reserve threshold is passed, the new equilibrium arises and lending commences.
Because of their different policy implications, determining in practice whether an economy is in a credit trap or jump-start equilibrium is a question of obvious importance. This question seems to be difficult to answer: As long as the Fed increases reserves only moderately, the two equilibria will be observationally equivalent, with both aggregate lending and equilibrium interest rates unresponsive to the easing in monetary policy. Thus, to make the distinction between the two equilibria, the Fed will have to rely on factors which are not easily observable. Indeed, as discussed in Section 3, the crucial factor determining which equilibrium arises is the level and shape of the collateral pricing function P (L, 0) i.e. how does an exogenous increase in corporate liquidity affect the implied value of collateral (assuming an interest rate of zero). Proposition 5 shows that when aggregate liquidity in the corporate sector is low, the economy will be in a credit trap equilibrium, while Proposition 3 shows that if aggregate liquidity is sufficiently high, a jump-start equilibrium 29 will tend to arise when P is convex in liquidation values. 29 Determining the form of the collateral pricing function is difficult. Still, the existence of either of two factors will point towards convexity, and hence towards the jump-start equilibrium. The first is when the financial constraints of a relatively large fraction of firms are severe.
30 In such a situation, marginal increases in liquidation values will have an increasing impact on the quantity of firms able to obtain financing, and thus an increasing impact on corporate liquidity and collateral values. The second factor pointing towards convexity of the pricing function, and hence towards a jump-start equilibrium, is a positive correlation between a need for external finance and firm productivity. Under this condition, marginal increases in firm liquidation values will allow more productive firms to obtain financing, implying a greater ex-post amount of liquidity in the corporate sector. Hence, marginal increases in liquidation values will have a positive and increasing impact on collateral values, implying a convex collateral pricing function P .
Conclusion
We analyze the limitations of the 'credit channel' in transmitting monetary policy and identify three potential equilibria. The first equilibria is one in which monetary policy successfully influence aggregate lending activity. In this conventional equilibrium expansionary monetary policy translates into an increase in collateral values and lending. The second equilibrium is a 'credit trap' equilibrium, where any easing of monetary policy beyond a certain level is completely ineffective in increasing lending and aggregate lending is constrained by low collateral values. In the third equilibrium monetary policy becomes effective only when the central bank inject a large amount of reserves to the banking sector. The underlying mechanism in all three equilibria is a feedback loop between lending, corporate liquidity, and collateral values. We show that credit traps will arise when liquidity in the corporate sector is low. Under such circumstances there is room for joint action of monetary and fiscal policy in order to boost lending. While the 'jump-start' equilibrium provides theoretical justification for a policy of 'quantitative easing', we argue that differentiating between a credit trap and a jump-start equilibrium will be hard in practice.
29 Although Proposition 3 does not require convexity, convexity is sufficient for a jump-start equilibrium, assuming that liquidity in the corporate sector is high enough (i.e. P (I, 0) > I). 30 Formally, G, the density function of firm internal wealth is skewed to the right. Figure 12 . A large discrete effect implied by an exogenous increase in date-1 liquidity in a credit trap equilibrium.
